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Abstract
Relative to those for high school graduates, lifetime earnings for college graduates are higher
for more recent cohorts. At the same time, across successive cohorts born after 1950, there
is a stagnation in the fraction of high school graduates that go on to complete a college
degree. What explains this phenomenon? I formulate a life-cycle model of human capital
accumulation in college and on the job, where successive cohorts decide whether or not to
acquire a college degree as well as the quality of their college education. Cohorts differ by the
sequence of rental price per unit of human capital they face and by the distribution of initial
human capital across individuals. My model reproduces the observed pattern in college
attainment for the 1920 to 1970 birth cohorts. The stagnation in college attainment is due
to the decrease in the growth rate of the rental price per unit of human capital commencing
in the 1970s. My model also generates the increase in lifetime earnings for college graduates
relative to those for high school graduates observed across cohorts.
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1 Introduction
Throughout American history, almost every generation has acquired substantially more ed-
ucation than its parental generation. This is no longer true. Figure 1 shows the fraction of
white males with a high school diploma that went on to complete a four-year college degree
(hereafter “college”) for the 1920 to 1970 cohorts, which are grouped by year of birth. The
fraction for the 1950 cohort was nearly twice as large as that for the 1920 cohort. However,
for cohorts born after 1950, the fraction of high school graduates that completed college
remained flat.1 These trends have been documented by, among others, Altonji, Bharadwaj,
and Lange (2008) and Goldin and Katz (2008). In this paper, I ask the following question:
What accounts for the trend observed in college attainment of white males and, in particular,
the slowdown in college attainment starting with the 1950s cohorts?
I argue that changes in the growth rate of the rental price per unit of human capital (hereafter
“price growth”) are crucial for generating the observed pattern of college attainment.2 I
illustrate this point with a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. Consider the earnings
(ESt ) of full-time workers of education level S at time t : E
S
t = wt × hSt . In this identity,
hSt is the quantity of human capital for education level S ∈ {H,C} (H stands for high
school and C stands for college) at time t, and wt is the price per unit of human capital
at time t. Suppose individuals live for two periods and college involves sacrificing current
earnings for future human capital, hCt+1. Lifetime earnings of a high school graduate are:
LEH = wt×hHt +wt+1×hHt+1. Lifetime earnings of a college graduate are: LEC = wt+1×hCt+1.
Individuals choose the option that yields the highest lifetime earnings. Thus, college is chosen
if LEC ≥ LEH , i.e., if hCt+1
hHt+1
≥ wt×hHt
wt+1×hHt+1
+ 1. Figure 2 plots college-graduate lifetime earnings
relative to high school-graduate lifetime earnings (hereafter “college premium”) for the 1920
to 1970 cohorts and shows that the premium has steadily increased starting with the 1940
1College attainment also remained flat for cohorts of white males born after 1970, but is not shown in
Figure 1 (see Appendix A). Differently from the case of males, college attainment for females rose throughout
the century, with only one brief stall during the 1950s cohorts (see Appendix A). This increase, however, was
arguably part of a more secular trend in both education and labor force participation influenced by reasons
beyond the scope of this paper. Although this paper deals only with the college attainment of white males,
general equilibrium price effects induced by the evolving college attainment of other demographic groups
and influencing the college decisions of white males are taken into account within the quantitative strategy.
2I acknowledge that other potential explanations such as changes in idiosyncratic earnings risk, changes
in the progressivity of taxation, changes in credit constraints, and changes in individuals’ uncertainty about
their innate ability can be important and deserve a quantitative assessment. However, I abstract from these
potential alternative explanations in this article.
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Figure 1: College attainment in the
United States (employed white males):
fraction of individuals with a high school
diploma that went on to complete a four-
year college degree. Source: IPUMS-
USA.
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Figure 2: College premium in the
United States (employed white males):
college-graduate lifetime earnings relative
to high school-graduate lifetime earnings.
Source: IPUMS-USA.
cohort.3 The college premium corresponds to
hCt+1
hHt+1
. Assuming
wt×hHt
wt+1×hHt+1
is constant over time,
the inequality will grow larger, which implies that more people will go to college. This would
contradict Figure 1 for those born after 1950. Previous studies find the flat college attainment
of those born after 1950 puzzling since the college premium has been increasing (see, among
others, Card and Lemieux, 2001, and Castro and Coen-Pirani, 2013). Figure 3 plots the
reciprocal of
wt×hHt
wt+1×hHt+1
, i.e., gross earnings growth of high school graduates. Earnings growth
drops significantly after the 1970s, the same time that the 1950s cohorts graduated from high
school. I investigate whether the drop in earnings growth reconciles Figure 2 and Figure 1
for those born after 1950.
As from the simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, earnings are the product of prices and
quantities, which are both unobservable. To explore the quantitative role of price growth
for the pattern of college attainment, I develop a model of human capital accumulation in
college and on the job that identifies prices and in turn produces the observed pattern of US
college attainment. The model takes the rental price of human capital w as exogenous, and
3The college premium for a cohort is constructed as the ratio of median earnings for individuals in that
cohort that graduated from college relative to those that graduated from high school only. Earnings for
cohorts are measured over one year when individuals in the cohort are between ages 31 and 40, depending
on data availability. Figure 2 reports the college premium for cohorts grouped in six-year bins. Patterns
similar to those in Figure 2 are reported for other measures of the returns to college. Heckman, Lochner,
and Todd (2008) report that cohort-based returns to college increased continuously over time for white men
entering the labor market between 1960 and 1985.
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Figure 3: Earnings growth for high school graduates in the United States (employed white
males): earnings growth is measured between the ages of 35 and 46 and calculated as annual
rates. Source: IPUMS-USA.
produces endogenous patterns of earnings growth and the college premium along with the
pattern of college attainment.
My model builds on Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998). It features life-cycle human
capital accumulation a` la Ben-Porath (1967) and a college choice. Individuals start off with
a high school degree and they differ by their innate ability and their initial human capital.
Each individual decides whether or not to acquire college education as well as the quality
of his college education. Once schooling is completed, individuals join the labor market
and can accumulate human capital on the job. Accumulation of human capital in college
requires both time and goods (that is, college quality) as inputs, while accumulation on the
job requires only time. Cohorts differ by the sequence of the rental price per unit of human
capital (hereafter “price sequence”) they face (a time effect) as well as by the distribution
of initial human capital across individuals (a cohort effect). A decrease in price growth
influences the college decision in two ways. First, it decreases the returns to human capital
investment and, therefore, the returns to college. Second, it increases the opportunity cost
of human capital accumulation in college relative to that on the job because of the lower
relative price of time. These two effects decrease the incentives to go to college more for
individuals with low innate ability.
I use earnings from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the cohorts
1961 through 1964 to calibrate the structural parameters of the model. I calibrate the price
sequence and the evolution of the distribution of initial human capital to Integrated Public
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Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) earnings data for the cohorts 1884 through 1970. The
shape of the distribution of individuals’ endowments determines the elasticity of college
attainment to changes in the price. Since endowments cannot be directly measured, I follow
the strategy in Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) and include the college premium as an
additional source of discipline. I use the NLSY dataset as it has a fixed-panel structure and
allows me to infer endowments from life-cycle earnings.
The model produces three main quantitative findings. First, in line with Bowlus and Robin-
son (2012), I find that the rate of growth of the rental price per unit of human capital
declines commencing in the 1970s. Price growth declines from 1.6 percent per year before
the 1970s to -0.1 percent per year after the 1970s. Second, the model reproduces the ob-
served pattern in US college attainment. For the 1920-1950 cohorts, the fraction of high
school graduates attaining college increases from 15 percent to 37 percent in the model and
from 18 percent to 38 percent in the data. For the 1950-1970 cohorts, the fraction decreases
of 4 percent and it remains constant at the level of the 1950 cohort in the data. The slow-
down in college attainment is generated almost exclusively by the slowdown in price growth.
Successive cohorts born after 1950 face diminished returns to human capital investment on
the job and a flat profile of returns to college quality, as the rental price of human capital
grows very slowly after 1970. Third, the model generates the increase in the college premium
for the 1920-1970 cohorts. The increase is generated by the slowdown in price growth and
an increased dispersion of the initial human capital for successive cohorts born after 1940.
Pre-1970s price growth fuels the increase in college attainment for the cohorts 1920 to 1950,
which has a significant selection effect on the average innate ability and average human cap-
ital associated with college and high school. The decline in price growth of the 1970s causes
selection into college to depend more on an individual’s innate ability over time. As the
rental price of human capital at high school graduation increases and its growth over the
lifecycle decreases, initial human capital becomes less important for the college decision; and
the college decision is ruled more by an individual’s innate ability. The increase in dispersion
of the initial human capital for successive cohorts born after 1940 is central to the recent
rise in the college premium: in its absence, the college premium increases of only 2 percent
after the 1950 cohort.
A few papers study the slowdown in college attainment in the US. Gemici and Wiswall
(2014) find an increase in tuitions costs discouraged college attendance for the 1950s to 1960s
cohorts. I consider an alternative formulation of my model where some college expenditures
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might be beyond the control of individuals. I divert from the baseline by assuming individuals
must pay a fixed cost to complete college and the relative price of college education is not
constant over time. Despite the model fit on college attainment improves for the 1940s
cohorts under this alternative formulation, the elasticity of college attainment to price growth
does not change substantially. Donovan and Herrington (2013) explain the slowdown in
college attainment with a version of myopic expectations on the rise of the college premium.
In an alternative exercise, I relax the assumption of perfect foresight and consider the simple
scenario of individuals expecting the price growth observed at high school graduation to
persist during their lifetime. The model implied timing of the slowdown in college attainment
aligns with the data under this alternative scenario. Lastly, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013)
conduct a comprehensive analysis of the slowdown in college attainment by considering
multiple channels. They also conclude tuitions and expectations do not hold a primary role
on the flat college attainment observed for the post-1950 cohorts. However, they find a small
effect of price growth on college attainment. By endogenizing human capital accumulation
in college and on the job, my framework allows for price growth to influence the returns to
college quality and human capital accumulation on the job along with the returns to time
investment in schooling.
The papers that are the closest to mine are Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2013), Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998), and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010). Restuccia and Vandenbroucke
(2013) study the rise of educational attainment and the evolution of relative earnings across
education groups. I consider both the rise and the flattening in college attainment. Heck-
man, Lochner, and Taber (1998) conduct a qualitative analysis of the dynamics of college
attainment and earnings inequality resulting from skill-biased technical change. Guvenen
and Kuruscu (2010) perform a quantitative study along the lines of Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998). Their results are consistent with the evolution of earnings inequality, the col-
lege premium, and the rise in college attainment. My paper replicates the pattern in earnings
inequality, the college premium, and both the rise and the flattening of college attainment
shown in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and section 3
calibrates it. Section 4 details the results of the quantitative experiment. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model
I extend the Ben-Porath (1967) framework to include an explicit college decision and to
let the rental price per unit of human capital change over time. Time is discrete and runs
from t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The economy is populated by individuals who live for 20 periods.
Each period corresponds to two years of calendar time. Individuals enter the model as high
school graduates at age 19, which is age 1 in the model. I use τ to denote a cohort: cohort
τ is composed of individuals of age 1 at time t + 19. I use j to denote age. Within a
cohort, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their innate ability, z ∈ <+, and their
level of initial human capital h1 ∈ <+, where the subscript indicates model age. Innate
ability represents an agent’s ability to learn and is fixed over his lifecycle.4 Endowments are
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function, Γτ (z, h1). This function varies
across cohorts on the initial human capital dimension. The marginal distribution of innate
ability is time-invariant. Individual types are pairs b ≡ (z, h1) on the set B = <2+. I assume
that individuals observe their type before any decision is made and that credit markets are
complete and there is no uncertainty.5
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time that can be spent either on working or on
human capital accumulation. They can accumulate human capital in college and on the job.
The college enrollment decision is made by cohorts at age 1. Individuals decide whether
or not to attend college as well as the quality of their college education. After schooling is
completed, human capital can be accumulated on the job by subtracting productive time
to work. Human capital is homogeneous between and within schooling types. There is one
price that clears the human capital market, w. The price grows exogenously at rate gt.
6 I
use R to denote the gross interest rate that is exogenously given. Each cohort differs by the
price sequence it faces and by the distribution of initial human capital.
4I interpret innate ability to reflect both endowment at birth and the influence of family background up
to age 19, as in Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
5I assume a frictionless credit market and abstract from borrowing constraint for two reasons primarily:
(i) to keep the model as tractable as possible in order to investigate the role of the rental price per unit of
human capital on college attainment, and (ii) in consideration of the evidence that, once family background
factors are taken into account, borrowing constraints play only a minor role in the college decisions of
the 1957-1965 cohorts, which are among those cohorts experiencing a stagnation in college attainment (see
Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
6The model is in partial equilibrium, as I study the college decision given the exogenous rental price
per unit of human capital. My approach can be viewed as the reverse of Krusell, Ohanian, Ros-Rull, and
Violante (2000)’s approach, who study the evolution of skill prices given exogenous college decisions.
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2.1 No-college Path
Individuals who decide not to go to college join the labor market right after high school
graduation at age 1. They maximize the present value of earnings over their working life-
time by dividing available time between human capital accumulation, i, and work (1 − i).
The problem for an individual of type (z, h1) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , on the no-college path
is given by
max
{ij}20j=1
20∑
j=1
(
1
R
)j−1
Ej
s.t. Ej = wτˆ+2(j−1)hj(1− ij)
hj+1 = f(z, hj, ij | H) + δhj
i ∈ [0, 1], τˆ = τ + 19
given h1.
An individual’s earnings at age j, Ej, equal the product of the amount of human capital
accumulated up to age j, the price of human capital at age j, and the fraction of time
allocated to market work at age j. The cost of human capital investment on the job is
forgone earnings. Earnings are adjusted downward by the fraction of time spent in human
capital investment. The return to human capital investment is higher future earnings. New
human capital is produced by combining the existing stock of human capital with time and
innate ability. Following Ben-Porath (1967),
f(z, h, i | H) = z(hi)βH .
The subscript H denotes the no-college path. The elasticity of human capital investment on
the job, βH ∈ (0, 1), determines the degree of diminishing marginal returns of human capital
investment. The productivity of human capital investment depends on an individual’s innate
ability. This specification is widely used in both the empirical literature and the human
capital literature (see, for example, Mincer, 1997 and Kuruscu, 2006). Finally, notice that
nothing is lost when studying human capital accumulation decisions by abstracting from
consumption and saving decisions. In particular, the focus on lifetime earnings maximization
does not require the assumption of risk neutrality: any concave utility function implies the
same human capital investment behavior.
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I formulate the problem in the language of dynamic programming. The value function,
Vj(h; z,w | H), gives the maximum present value of earnings at age j from state h for
an individual of innate ability z who faces the life-cycle price sequence w. In its recursive
formulation,
Vj(h; z,w | H) = max
h′ ,i∈[0,1]
wjh (1− i) +R−1Vj+1(h′ ; z,w | H)
s.t. h
′
= z(hi)βH + δh.
(1)
For βH ∈ (0, 1) the problem is concave. Standard methods can be used to solve for the value
function and the policy function for time investment in human capital i.
The first-order conditions for human capital investment and working time imply the Euler
equation:
wjhj ≤ zβHhβHj iβH−1j︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ in h
wj (1 + gj)
R
(
19−j∑
u=0
δu
u∏
k=1
(1 + gj+k)
R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
life-cycle return to a unit of h
, (2)
for gj =
wj+1
wj
− 1. The equation holds with equality for i ∈ (0, 1), otherwise individuals
spend their entire time on human capital accumulation. In eq. 2, the left-hand side is the
marginal cost of human capital accumulation, that is, forgone earnings; the right-hand side
is the marginal benefit of human capital accumulation, that is, the present discounted value
of the future stream of earnings derived from a marginal increase in the time attributed
to human capital accumulation. The amount of time spent accumulating human capital
depends on individual characteristics and prices. Individuals with higher innate ability in-
vest more time accumulating human capital on the job and therefore have steeper earnings
profiles. Individuals with higher human capital at high school graduation spend less time
accumulating human capital on the job and therefore have flatter earnings profiles. Time
allocation decisions are independent from price units. Because the cost of human capital
accumulation on the job is forgone earnings, multiplying the price sequence by a positive
constant increases the marginal benefit of and the marginal cost of human capital accumula-
tion equally, leaving the trade-off between the two unaffected. The time-allocation decision
depends instead on the shape of the price sequence, that is, the rate of growth of the price
over the lifecycle. Because human capital investment involves sacrificing earnings today for
higher human capital tomorrow, an increase in price growth increases the marginal benefit
of human capital accumulation, leaving the marginal cost unchanged. The forward-looking
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nature of eq. 2 implies that the overall stream of future price growth throughout the lifecycle
influences current human capital investment.7
The value of the no-college path for an individual of type (z, h1) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , is:
VH(h1, z,wτ ) = V1(h1; z,wτ | H)
=
(
1
R
)j−1
Vj(hj; z,wτ | H)
=
(
1
R
)j−1
wτˆ+2(j−1)
[
ajhj + b
H
j z
1
1−βH
]
,
where j denotes the first age at which earnings are strictly positive. The constant aj rep-
resents the discounted lifetime return at age j to renting out a unit of human capital net
of depreciation. For the case of no full-time accumulation on the job, that is, j = 1, the
first addend denotes the contribution of initial human capital to lifetime earnings, while the
second addend adjusts lifetime earnings for the new human capital accumulated on the job
throughout the lifecycle. The constant bH is indexed by schooling, H, since it depends on
the elasticity of on-the-job accumulation, βH . Both constants a and b
H have closed-form
solutions when the parameter values satisfy some restrictions. See Appendix B for details.
2.2 College Path
Individuals on the college path stay in college for two periods and join the labor market
at age 3. When they start college, they pick the quality of their college education. After
graduation from college, they maximize the present value of earnings over their working
lifetime by dividing time between work and human capital accumulation, as with the no-
college path. The problem for an individual of type (z, h1) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , on the
7I relax the assumption of perfect foresight in Section 4.1.
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college path is given by
max
{ij}20j=3,e
20∑
j=3
(
1
R
)j−1
Ej −
(
1 +
1
R
)
e
s.t. Ej = wτˆ+2(j−1)hj(1− ij)
hj+1 = q(z, hj, e) + hj, j = 1, 2.
hj+1 = f(z, hj, ij | C) + δhj, j ≥ 3.
i ∈ [0, 1], τˆ = τ + 19
given h1.
A college graduate’s on-the-job human capital accumulation technology differs from the no-
college case by the value of the elasticity of human capital investment, βC . I assume that
college requires full-time investment, therefore earnings are zero for the first two periods
for those in college. Human capital accumulation in college requires innate ability, college
quality e, and human capital as inputs. Individuals who invest more on their college quality
acquire more human capital while in college given their endowments. Investment in college
quality represents all sorts of college expenditures, such as tuition and fees, as well as the
disutility associated with putting a certain effort in learning. I assume that college quality is
chosen once and for all at the beginning of college and corresponding expenditures are paid in
two equal amounts each period while in college. The in-college human capital accumulation
function is8
q(z, h, e) = zhηe1−η.
Given human capital at college graduation, h3(h1, e), the on-the-job human capital accumu-
lation problem for the college path is identical to the one for the no-college path up to the
elasticity of human capital investment on the job, βC . The college quality problem can be
formulated as maxe V3(h3(h1, e); z,wτ | C) −
(
1 + 1
R
)
e, for V3 as in eq. 1 with j = 3. The
first-order conditions are(
1 +
1
R
)
=
∂h3
∂e︸︷︷︸
∆ in h3
(
1
R
)2
∂V3(h3; z,wτ | C)
∂h3
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
lifetime return to a unit of h3
(3)
8Similar functional forms for the technology of human capital accumulation in school have been considered
by, among others, Manuelli and Seshadri (2010) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2010).
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that is, (
1 +
1
R
)
=
∂h3
∂e
(
1
R
)j−1
wτˆ+2(j+2)aj
 j∏
u=4
(
AβCh
βC−1
u−1 + δ
) ,
where j and a are defined as for the no-college path. The left-hand side of eq. 3 is the
marginal cost of increasing college quality — that is, the present value of additional expenses
derived from a marginal increase in college quality. The right-hand side of eq. 3 is the
marginal benefit of increasing college quality — that is, the present discounted value of the
future stream of earnings derived from a marginal increase in college quality. Individuals
with higher innate ability and higher initial human capital invest more on college quality.
Both a higher initial level and a higher growth over the lifecycle of the price imply a higher
optimal college quality. When the price at high school graduation increases, the return to
college quality increases proportionally with it, while the cost of college quality remains
unaltered. When price growth increases, the benefit of human capital accumulation on the
job increases (a increases in price growth) and so does the return to college quality, while
the cost of college quality remains unaltered once again.
The value of the college path for an individual of type (z, h1) ∈ B, born in cohort τ , is the
discounted value of lifetime earnings net of total expenditures on college quality:
VC(h1, z,wτ ) = V3(hC(h1, e
?); z,wτ | C)−
(
1 +
1
R
)
e?,
=
(
1
R
)j−1
wτˆ+2(j−1)
[
ajhj + b
C
j z
1
1−βC
]
−
(
1 +
1
R
)
e?,
where e? denotes optimal college quality (from eq. 3) and bC is indexed by schooling, C,
because it depends on the elasticity of on-the-job accumulation as for the no-college case.
2.3 College Decision
Individuals within a cohort choose their education level upon graduation from high school.
They do so based on their type, (z, h1), and the price sequence observed during their lifetime,
w. A college education is pursued if and only if
VC(h1, z,w) ≥ VH(h1, z,w). (4)
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Let the indicator function 1(h1, z,w) take the value of 1 if an individual pursues a college
education and 0 if he does not. Thus,
1(h1, z,w) =
{
1, if (4) holds,
0 otherwise.
There are three assumed trade-offs between the college and no-college paths: (i) Human
capital is not productive during college education but is when work is chosen. (ii) The
technology for human capital accumulation in college is not the same as the technology for
human capital accumulation on the job. (iii) The elasticity of human capital investment on
the job differs between education levels. Each of these three trade-offs shape the effect of
the price sequence on the college decision. The decision rule in eq. 4 can be rewritten as(
1
R
)2
[V3(h3(h1, e
?); z,w | C)− V3(h3; z,w | H)] ≥ (5)(
1 +
1
R
)
e? + V1(h1; z,w | H)− V3(h3; z,w | H),
where e? indicates the optimal level of college quality, as it results from eq. 3. In eq. 5, on
the left-hand side are the gains of college — that is, the additional earnings received from
age 3 onwards, and on the right-hand side are the costs of college — that is, total expenses
on college quality and forgone earnings. By substituting the functional forms for the value
function and earnings:(
1
R
)2
w3
{
a3
(
hC3 (h1, e
?)
l
l − hH3 (h1, i1, i2)
)
+
(
bC3 z
1
1−βC − bH3 z
1
1−βH
)}
≥(
1 +
1
R
)
e? + w1h1(1− i1) + w2
R
hH2 (1− i2),
where, for ease of notation, the time subscript on the price is replaced by the age subscript
and I focus on the case of no full-time accumulation on the job — that is, j = 1 for the no-
college path and j = 3 for the college path. Starting from the latter of the three trade-offs,
higher price growth over the lifecycle implies higher returns to human capital investment on
the job. When the elasticity of human capital investment on the job for the college path is
at least as big as that for the no-college path, the returns to college increase as price growth
increases (notice the term bC3 z
1
1−βC − bH3 z
1
1−βH ).9 On the second trade-off, a higher rental
9This mechanism is related to the reverse causality mechanism from anticipated TFP growth to educa-
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price per unit of human capital at high school graduation (henceforth “price level”) increases
the net return to college quality, where else it leaves the net return to accumulating human
capital on the job unchanged. The cost and benefit of human capital accumulation on the
job both increase proportionally with the price level. However, only the benefit of college
quality increases with the price level (compare the pair 1/R2w3a3h
H
3 and w1h1i1+1/Rw2h
H
2 i2
to the pair 1/R2w3a3h
C
3 and
(
1 + 1
R
)
e?). Lastly, on the first trade-off, the opportunity cost
of accumulating human capital in college relative to accumulating human capital on the job
decreases with higher price growth. The commitment to four-year full-time investment in
human capital after high school graduation associated with college becomes relatively less
burdensome as price growth increases.
Who goes to college? On average, individuals with high innate ability go to college. They are
more productive learners, both in college and on the job, and therefore obtain higher returns
from attending college. An individual’s initial human capital also influences the college
choice. Because human capital and college quality are complements in the accumulation of
human capital in college, individuals with higher initial human capital face bigger returns to
college quality. However, because human capital is not productive during college, individuals
with lower initial human capital have a lower opportunity cost of spending four years in
college (lower forgone earnings). Notice that the importance of the margin associated with
initial human capital in the college decision depends on the lifetime price sequence. As the
price level increases and its growth over the lifecycle decreases, initial human capital becomes
less and less important in the college decision; and the college decision is ruled more and
more by an individual’s innate ability.
The fraction of cohort τ acquiring a college education is determined from the cumulative
distribution of initial endowments Γτ (z, h1):
CAτ (wτ ,Γτ ) =
∫
(z,h1)∈B
1(h1, z,wτ ) dΓτ (z, h1).
3 Calibration
The quantitative strategy consists of setting the model in line with the path of unconditional
earnings for the 1884-1970 cohorts and then exploring the model implications for education-
tional attainment in Bils and Klenow (2000).
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Parameter Symbol Value Source
Model period 2 years
Gross interest rate R 1.086
OTJ accumulation:
- college βC 0.871 Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998)
- high school βH 0.832 Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998)
- depreciation rate 1− δ 0
Table 1: Calibration. Deep parameters: parameters chosen without solving the model.
specific earnings and college attainment for those cohorts. The approach I follow to set the
model’s parameters consists of three steps. First, I set a number of parameters a-priori.
Second, I calibrate the parameters that are common to all cohorts (deep parameters) to a
number of key moments in the NLSY79 dataset for the early 1960s cohorts. Third and last,
I use IPUMS-USA data to infer the evolution of the rental price of human capital over time
and that of the distribution of initial human capital across cohorts. The following subsections
detail each of these steps.
I use two main data sources: the Integrated Public Use Micro Data Series for the United
States (IPUMS-USA by Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroede, and Sobek, 2010)
and the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY79 by Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2002). IPUMS-USA provides quantitative information on long-time changes in
earnings; the NLSY79 provides a constant panel that follows a limited number of individuals
over time. I focus on a sample of white males in the labor force between the ages of 19 and 58
who have achieved either a high school diploma or a four-year college degree. Since earnings
statistics in the data are computed for people in the labor force only, earnings statistics in
the model ignore agents with full-time post-schooling investment. The IPUMS-USA data is
not a fixed panel, and therefore I compute cohort data by constructing synthetic cohorts.
See Appendix A for full descriptions of each data set and further details on sample selection.
3.1 Deep parameters
I assume parameter values for which the literature provides evidence. The parameters that I
calibrate without solving the model are reported in Table 1 together with the assigned values.
I set the gross interest rate R to 1.04 (annual rate). Estimates of the elasticity of human
15
Parameter µlog(z) µlog(h1) σlog(z) σlog(h1) ρ η w1980
Value -1.687 4.248 0.215 0.450 0.758 0.506 1.481
Table 2: Calibration. Deep parameters: parameters computed by solving the model.
capital investment on the job in the literature typically vary from 0.5 to almost 0.95 (see
Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999). My specification of the on-the-job accumulation
function is a particular case of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).10 These authors
provide estimates of the elasticity of on-the-job human capital investment at two education
levels: high school and four-year college or more. I set βH = 0.832 and βC = 0.871. I set the
depreciation rate, δ− 1, to zero to be consistent with Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).
Rupert and Zanella (2012) show that the declining portion of the earnings profile is mainly
a result of a decreased labor supply rather than decreased hourly wage.
I calibrate the distribution of initial endowments, the in-college human capital accumu-
lation function and the rental price of human capital in year 1980 to the age variation
of unconditional earnings moments, college expenses, college attainment, and college pre-
mium for the 1961 to 1964 cohorts. I assume that the distribution of initial endowments,
Γτ , is jointly log-normal.
11 This class of distributions is characterized by 5 parameters,
{µlog (z), µlog (h1), σlog (z), σlog (h1), ρ}. Thus, the list of parameters that are calibrated within
the model are12
Λ = {µlog (z), µlog (h1), σlog (z), σlog (h1), ρ, η, w1980}.
I calibrate these parameters to the following statistics for the 1961-1964 cohorts:
1. Age variation of unconditional earnings moments: mean and coefficient of variation
of the distribution of unconditional earnings at six points over the lifecycle, j ∈ J =
{23− 26, 27− 30, 31− 34, 35− 38, 39− 42, 43− 45} (Source: NLSY79.)
10The human capital accumulation function in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) is ziηShβS for S ∈
{C,H}. They work with four ability types and two education levels (high school and 4 years of college or
more) and estimate the human capital accumulation function with NLSY79 data on white-male earnings for
the period 1979-1993.
11Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006) show that, in this set-up, in terms of replicating life-cycle earnings
dynamics, the gains of going from a parametric to a non-parametric approach for the distribution of initial
endowments are not substantial.
12At this stage only the distribution of initial endowments for the 1961 to 1964 cohorts is calibrated. The
marginal distributions of initial human capital for the 1920 to 1970 cohorts are calibrated in the next section
with the cohort-specific parameters.
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Data Model
Mean earnings: growth btwn age 23-26 and 43-45 73.43% 73.36%
CV of earnings: age 23-26 0.499 0.474
CV of earnings: growth btwn age 23-26 and 43-45 83.85% 94.71%
College premium 1.40 1.58
College attainment 35.26% 34.02%
Average college expenditures 41.54% 39.88%
Table 3: Model fit. Life-cycle earnings dynamics, college premium, college attainment, and
college expenses for the 1961-1964 cohorts. Source: NLSY-79, IPUMS-USA, The College
Board (2007), and the author.
2. College premium for the 23- to 26-year-old: ratio of median earnings of four-year college
graduates to median earnings of high school graduates (Source: IPUMS-USA.)
3. Education composition: fraction of high school graduates with a four-year college
degree (Source: IPUMS-USA.)
4. College expenses: ratio of average tuition and fees for the period 1982 to 1988 to average
earnings of 23- to 26-year-old four-year college graduates, (Source: IPUMS-USA and
The College Board, 2007.)
There are a total of 14 targets.13 Formally, the calibration strategy consists of minimizing
the following equation:
min
Λ
14∑
u=1
(
xu(Λ)− x˜u
x˜u
)2
.
For a given Λ, I compute the model moments, xu(Λ), that correspond to the targets described
above, x˜u.
Even though the parameter values are chosen simultaneously to match the data targets,
each parameter has a first-order effect on some targets. The elasticity of substitution of the
in-college human capital accumulation function is disciplined by data on college expenses.
Data on college expenses use Trends in College Pricing (The College Board, 2007) data on
average tuition and fees for private and public colleges in the United States. The rental price
of human capital in year 1980 is important for matching the educational composition. The
13Earnings in target 1 are normalized to mean earnings at ages 23-26. Because of the choice of units for
the rental price of human capital, it is unreasonable to expect the model to match the level of earnings.
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Figure 4: Model fit. Life-cycle earnings dynamics, 1961-1964 cohorts. Earnings are normal-
ized to mean earnings at ages 23-26. Data (solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines). Source:
NLSY-79 and the author.
moments in targets 1 and 2 discipline the distribution of initial endowments. The argument
for identification behind this exercise follows Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006).
The only source of earnings inequality in the model is due to initial endowments. An indi-
vidual’s type (z, h1) implies a profile of human capital accumulation over the lifecycle and
therefore a profile of earnings over the lifecycle. Within a cohort, a distribution of types
maps into a distribution of earnings over the lifecycle. Thus, initial endowments can be
identified through the evolution of the distribution of earnings over the lifecycle. The key
assumption is that systematic differences in growth rates are the major driving force behind
earnings dynamics over the lifecycle. This assumption is supported by empirical studies that
estimate earnings processes from micro data sets (see, for example Guvenen, 2009). The
NLSY79 dataset has a fixed-panel structure and allows me to infer initial endowments from
life-cycle earnings. Lastly, I include the college premium as an additional source of discipline.
The college premium contains information on the college-selection mechanism in terms of
the (z, h1) types that choose college. Further details on the identification of each parameter
of the distribution of initial endowments in the context of my model are in Appendix C.
The model is solved numerically. I simulate the earnings and schooling paths of 100,000
individuals in each of the 1961-1964 cohorts. The values of calibrated parameters are reported
in Table 2, while the model’s performance on targets is reported in Table 3 and shown in
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Earnings: Data Model
HS COL HS COL
Mean, growth btwn age 27-29 and 43-45 2.18% 42.12% 1.84% 37.58%
CV, growth btwn age 27-29 and 43-45 18.01% 40.18% 0.02% 35.70%
Median/mean, age 27-29 1.080 1.028 1.058 1.066
Median/mean, growth btwn age 27-29 and 43-45 -2.19% 12.76% -0.50% 11.44%
Table 4: Results. Life-cycle earnings dynamics for high school graduates (HS) and for
college graduates (COL), 1961-1964 cohorts. Source: NLSY-79, IPUMS-USA, The College
Board (2007), and the author.
Figure 4. Overall, the model is successful in matching the data. The mean age-earnings
profile is reproduced in its growth and concavity. This results from human capital investment
being disproportionately more convenient at younger ages. The life-cycle pattern of the
coefficient of variation is also well reproduced. The coefficient of variation of earnings at
ages 23-26 is 0.5 in the model as well as in the data. The college premium is slightly over-
estimated: it equals 1.58 in the model and 1.40 in the data. College premium could be
delivered exactly at the price of a worse fit on the lifecycle pattern of the coefficient of
variation of earnings. A smaller dispersion of initial human capital and a smaller correlation
between innate ability and initial human capital are needed to match the college premium
exactly. However, dispersion of initial human capital together with dispersion of innate
ability are key to match the lifecycle pattern in the coefficient of variation of earnings.
Results: 1961-1964 cohorts I assess the merit of the model based on moments that are
not targets of the calibration exercise. I pick those moments to my evaluation of the model as
a model of life-cycle earnings in a context of a college choice. Figure 5 and table 4 display the
model performance on the age variation of education-specific earnings moments for the 1961-
1964 cohorts. The first panel shows the mean age-earnings profile for high school graduates
and that for college graduates. First, notice that in the data the mean age-earnings profile for
high school graduates is essentially flat, while that for college graduates has a considerably
positive slope. Mean earnings of high school graduates grow 2 percent between the ages
of 27 and 45 in the data, while those of college graduates grow of 42 percent. The model
generates this fact as a result of positive association between college and innate ability. The
average innate ability of college graduates is 0.2281, while that for high school graduates
is 0.1621. The model predicts that, absent heterogeneity in human capital, agents with
high innate ability have steeper profiles of human capital accumulation than agents with
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Figure 5: Results. Life-cycle earnings dynamics for high school graduates and for college
graduates, 1961-1964 cohorts. Earnings are normalized to mean earnings at ages 23-26. Data
(solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines). Source: NLSY79 and the author.
low innate ability. The difference between life-cycle earnings growth for college graduates
and that for high school graduates is over-predicted by the model. Between the ages of 27
and 45, college graduate earnings grow 36 percentage points more than high school graduate
earnings in the model and 40 percentage points more in the data.14 The model is consistent
with a faster rise in the dispersion of earnings over the lifecycle for college graduates relative
14One extension of the model carrying the necessary degrees of freedom to match earnings growth for both
high school graduates and college graduates features education-specific prices of human capital, i.e., a price
for high school human capital and a price for college human capital. I am not pursuing this extension because
(i) of the parsimony of the single-price model, (ii) the single price model performs quite well on education-
specific earnings moments, and (iii) in the single price model, education-specific earnings moments can be
used as a metric of the merit of the model.
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to that for high school graduates. This is because college graduates have larger mean and
larger dispersion of innate ability than high school graduates and the incentives to human
capital accumulation increase more than proportionally with an individual’s innate ability.
Finally, the model under-estimates the growth of the coefficient of variation of earnings over
the lifecycle for both education groups and over-estimates its differential between college
and high school graduates of 10 percentage points. To further check the model implications
on life-cycle earnings inequality, I consider the performance of the model on an additional
moment: the asymmetry of the earnings distribution measured by the ratio of median to
mean earnings. The model generates life-cycle patterns of the asymmetry of the earnings
distribution close to the data. Right skewness follows because incentives for human capital
investment increase more than proportionally with an individual’s innate ability (see eq. 7
and recall that β < 1). The positive association of innate ability with college is the reason
for: (i) a higher average life-cycle skewness of college graduate earnings relative to that
of high school graduate earnings and (ii) a higher rise in the skewness of college graduate
earnings over the lifecycle relative to that of high school graduate earnings.
3.2 Cohort-specific parameters
Cohorts exogenously differ by two dimensions: they face different life-cycle price sequences (a
time effect) and they face different distributions of initial human capital across individuals (a
cohort effect).15 I calibrate time and cohort effects to replicate the evolution of unconditional
earnings moments, first and second moments, for the 1884 to 1970 cohorts.
The price sequence is identified with data on life-cycle earnings growth for successive cohorts.
Consider mean earnings of individuals in cohort τ at age j
Eτj = wτˆ+2(j−1)h˜τj
where h˜τj =
∫
(z,h1)
hτj(1− lτj)dΓτ (z, h1). Lifecycle earnings growth for cohort τ is measured
15The distribution of innate ability is assumed to stay constant across cohorts. This is possibly a restrictive
assumption for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1940 considering the substantial expansion in high school
education that happened during this period. Within the framework of this paper, exogenous changes in
the distribution of innate ability of high school graduates cannot be separately identified from those in the
distribution of human capital of high school graduates due to data restrictions.
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by the change in mean earnings between age j and j
′
> j:
Eτj′
Eτj
= (1 + gw)
j
′−j−1 h˜τj′
h˜τj
= (1 + gw)
j
′−j−1(1 + res1(gw, gµ, gσ))
where res1(·) is a residual arising from human capital accumulation, gw is price growth, gµ
is growth in mean initial human capital, and gσ is growth in the standard deviation of initial
human capital. I am assuming these three growth rates to be constant for ease of exposure;
This assumption is dropped in the actual calibration exercise. If there is no human capital
accumulation on the job, lifecycle earnings growth equals 1+gw and perfectly identifies price
growth. As the age at which life-cycle earnings growth is measured increases, the benefits
of human capital accumulation decrease, and life-cycle earnings growth more closely mimics
price growth (see Appendix C for further details). Therefore, I use life-cycle earnings growth
late in the lifecycle for the 1884 to 1958 cohorts to discipline price growth (Figure 6, panel
(c), solid lines). This methodology for recovering price growth was originally proposed by
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and more recently used by Bowlus and Robinson (2012)
to measure the prices of human capital across various education levels.
The evolution of the distribution of initial human capital is identified with data on mean and
dispersion of cross-sectional earnings over successive years. Cross-sectional earnings growth
at age j is measured by the change in average earnings between j-year olds in cohort τ and
j-year olds in cohort τ
′
:
Eτ ′j
Eτj
= (1 + gw)
τ
′−τ−1 h˜τ ′j
h˜τj
= (1 + gw)
τ
′−τ−1(1 + gµ + res2(gw, gµ, gσ))
where res2(·) is a residual arising from human capital accumulation. If there is no human
capital accumulation on the job and college augments an individual’s initial human capital of
∆, cross-sectional earnings growth equals (1+gw)(1+gµ)
∆˜
τ
′
∆˜τ
for ∆˜τ = ∆CAτ+1(1−CAτ ), and
identifies changes in average initial human capital given gw and a path of college attainment.
Earnings dispersion is measured by the coefficient of variation of earnings. Thus, growth of
cross-sectional earnings dispersion at age j is measured by the change in earnings dispersion
between j-year olds in cohort τ and j-year olds in cohort τ
′
:
σh˜
τ
′
j
Eτ ′j
Eτj
σh˜τj
=
1 + gσ + res3(gw, gµ, gσ)
1 + gµ + res2(gw, gµ, gσ)
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where σh˜τj =
∫
(z,h1)
(hτj(1 − lτj) − h˜τj)dΓτ (z, h1) and res3(·) is a residual arising from hu-
man capital accumulation. Given a price sequence and a sequence of means and standard
deviations of initial human capital, the model produces a sequence of mean and standard de-
viation of cross-sectional earnings. Thus, I discipline the evolution of distributions of initial
human capital with data on the growth in mean and coefficient of variation of cross-sectional
earnings for a specific age group over the 1940-2008 period (Figure 6, panels (b) and (c),
solid lines).
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Figure 6: Model fit. Earnings: life-cycle growth, cross-sectional growth, and growth of
cross-sectional dispersion. Growth rates are calculated as decennial changes and presented
at annual rates. Data (solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines). Source: IPUMS-USA and
author.
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The calibration targets are collected in Figure 6. Each of them can be summarized quite well
by two distinct growth rates: (i) pre-1970s and post-1970s growth for the time-series data
and (ii) pre-1939 and post-1939 growth for the cross-cohort data. The calibration targets
are therefore condensed in the following six moments:
1. growth of median earnings of white males between the ages of 31-40 for the 1940-1970
period and the 1980-2008 period (source: IPUMS-USA, Figure 6a),
2. growth of the coefficient of variation of earnings of white males between the ages of
31-40 for the 1940-1970 period and the 1980-2008 period (source: IPUMS-USA, Figure
6b), and
3. growth of average earnings between the ages 39-45 and 49-55 for the 1884-1920 cohorts
and the 1924-1958 cohorts (source: IPUMS-USA, Figure 6c).
The age group in targets 2 and 3 is chosen to match the age group at which the college
premium is measured, since the evolution of the distribution of initial human capital is a key
determinant of the path of the college premium.
I structure the paths of the time effect and the cohort effect in the model to match the
structure of the target moments in the data. That is, I allow a trend break to accour (i)
in price growth in year 1970, (ii) in the growth of the mean of the distribution of initial
human capital for the 1939 cohort, and (iii) in the growth of the standard deviation of the
distribution of initial human capital for the 1939 cohort. More formally, the paths are as
follows:
• for price growth:
xt =

xt−1[1 + gw,1] t ≤ 1969
xt−1[1 + ωgw,1 + (1− ω)gw,2] t ∈ [1970, 1979]
xt−1[1 + gw,2] t ≥ 1980,
Bowlus and Robinson (2012) estimate price growth from life-cycle earnings growth for
the period 1963-2008, at yearly frequency. I use their estimates and set ω = 0.8 to
deliver average price growth in the 1963-1970 period as a weighted average of average
price growth in the 1963-1970 period and that in the 1980-2008 period.
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• for the distribution of initial human capital:
xτ =
{
xτ−1[1 + gx,1] τ ≤ 1939
xτ−1[1 + gx,2] τ ≥ 1940,
where x = {µ, σ} and τ indicates the year of birth of the cohort.
There is a total of 6 targets for 6 unkowns. Formally, the calibration strategy consists of
solving a system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns. For a given Γ = {g1,x, g2,x}x={w,µ,σ}, I compute
the model moments, X(Γ), that correspond to the targets described above. I then solve for
the zero of the function F (Γ) defined by
F (Γ) = X˜ −X(Γ),
where X˜ are the targets described above.
I simulate the earnings and schooling path for 100,000 individuals in the 1884-1970 cohorts.
Figure 6 and table 5 shows the performance of the model on targeted moments. From Figure
6, the model is able to replicate the main patterns in the targets by allowing just one trend
break for the cohort effect and one trend break for the time effect. The calibrated gw pair
is {1.57%,−0.15%}, calculated as annual rates. The calibration implies a slowdown in price
growth starting in the 1970s.16 The estimated pattern of price growth is in line with Bowlus
and Robinson (2012)’s estimates in both direction and magnitude. Bowlus and Robinson
(2012) find a generalized trend break in the growth rates of the rental prices of human capital
for various education levels in years 1974-1975. In their estimates, price growth for college
and high school graduates declines of 1.97 percentage points (from an average growth of
1.47% to -0.05%), compared to my 1.72 percentage points decline. In Section 4.1, I explore
the implications of the model when price growth is set to Bowlus and Robinson (2012)’s
estimates.
The calibrated changes in the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of initial
human capital are gµ = {0.33%,−0.05%} and gσ = {−2.94%, 1.80%}, calculated as annual
16Possible reasons for the slowdown in price growth include a slowdown in productivity growth, which
influences the demand of human capital. Also, an increase in the supply of human capital following the
increase in female labor force participation, the increase in average years of schooling of females and non-
white males, and the increase in cohorts size (the baby boom) can also have contributed to the slowdown in
price growth.
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Earnings: Data Model
Grw 1 Grw 2 Grw 1 Grw 2
Cross-sectional growth 2.71% -0.25% 2.74% -0.23%
Cross-sectional growth of dispersion -2.00% 0.86% -2.03% 0.91%
Life-cycle growth 1.79% -0.07% 1.77% -0.07%
Table 5: Model fit. Earnings: life-cycle growth, cross-sectional growth, and growth of cross-
sectional dispersion. The column Grw 1 indicates the average growth rate for the pre-1970s
period for cross-sectional data and for the pre-1939 cohorts for life-cycle data. The column
Grw 2 indicates the average growth rate for the post-1970s period for cross-sectional data
and for the for the post-1939 cohorts for life-cycle data.
rates. What is the significance of a change in the distribution of initial human capital over
cohorts? An individual’s human capital is the amount of knowledge he possesses. Hence,
the distribution of initial human capital is a measure of the “quality” of the high school
graduates. The calibration implies an increase in the average “quality” of successive cohorts
of high school graduates followed by a decline.17 This pattern is consistent with anecdotal
evidence presented by Taubman and Wales (1972) and Bishop (1989) on cognitive skills of
high school graduates. Taubman and Wales (1972) observe that test scores of high school
graduates decline starting with the late-1920s cohorts, after increasing from the beginning of
the century. Bishop (1989) reports a decrease in the average scores of high school graduates
on normed tests, such as the ITED and ITBS, starting with the late-1940s cohorts and
following 50 years of uninterrupted improvement. Lastly, the calibration implies that the
dispersion of initial human capital increases starting with the 1940s cohorts. Even though
the calibration is set to replicate average changes in earnings dispersion for the pre-1970s
and post-1970s periods, the model matches the pattern of earnings dispersion for the various
years within each period quite well.
17An evident reason for the decline in the quality of successive cohorts of high school graduates is the
expansion in high school education that happened between the 1920 and the 1940 cohorts. Among those
born in 1920, the fraction of white males with at least a high school diploma was 57 percent. This fraction was
82 percent for those born in 1940. A positive correlation between schooling and innate ability and/or human
capital, as it transpires from evidence on tests scores, implies that large changes in high school attainment
can potentially have a significant selection effect on the average innate ability and average human capital
associated with high school education.
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4 Results
The main results of the paper are in terms of college attainment and college premium. In
this section, I present the model implications for the patterns of college attainment and
college premium for the 1920-1970 cohorts and I investigate the quantitative contribution of
changes in the rental price per unit of human capital along with changes in the distribution
of initial human capital to those patterns.
College attainment of the 1920-1970 cohorts is shown in Figure 13a and summarized in Table
6, column “Model/Baseline”. The model generates an increase and subsequent flattening of
college attainment. After calibration, the model indicates that 36 percent of the 1961-1964
cohorts earned a college degree, which is close to the data. The fraction of high school
graduates in the 1920-1950 cohorts that earned a college degree increases from 15.0 percent
to 37.0 percent in the model and from 17.8 percent to 37.7 percent in the data. The positive
trend contracts starting with the early-1950s cohorts. From the 1950 cohort to the 1970
cohort, college attainment decreases from 37.0 percent to 33.4 percent in the model, but
increases from 37.7 percent to 39.7 percent in the data. Overall, for the 1920 to 1950 cohorts,
the fraction of college graduates increases each cohort of 2.1 percentage points on average
in the model and of 1.2 percentage points in the data. In contrast, that for the 1950-1970
cohorts decreases of 0.4 percentage points in the model and of 0.1 points in the data. The
flat college attainment the model generates for the post-1950 cohorts is a critical result of
the paper. However, the model implies a flat college attainment for the 1940s cohorts also.
In Section 4.1, I discuss the role of price expectations on the college decision and conclude
that if the slowdown in price growth was not foreseen by individuals, the slowdown in college
attainment starts with the late 1940s cohorts both in the model and in the data.
College attainment is mostly driven by the path of the rental price per unit of human capital
(the time effect).18 Figure 8 shows a decomposition exercise of the time and cohort effects
on the pattern of college attainment. In a first experiment (“Time effect only”), I keep the
initial human capital distribution of each cohort the same, so that the only difference between
cohorts is the life-cycle price sequence. The resulting pattern of college attainment is almost
the same as that in the baseline exercise. Individuals born in the 1920s face a steeper price
18The distribution of initial endowments across individuals is most important in determining the response
of college attainment to changes in the rental price per unit of human capital. See, among others, Athreya
and Eberly (2010), whose paper deals with asymmetric returns to college while investigating the magnitude
of the response of college attainment to changes in the college premium.
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Figure 7: Results. College attainment and the college premium in the United States. Data
(solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines). Source: IPUMS-USA and author.
sequence than those born in the 1950s and therefore have a higher return to human capital
investment on the job. However, those born in the 1950s face also a higher price at high
school graduation than that faced by those born in the 1920s. This makes college a better
deal for the later cohorts because of the higher return to college quality. Individuals born
after 1950 face both diminished returns to human capital investment on the job and a flat
profile of returns to college quality, as the rental price of human capital grows very slowly
after 1970. Thus, college attainment flattens. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013) contemplate
the role of a decline in price growth on the slowdown in college attainment and find the
magnitude of this effect to be relatively small. In their framework, price growth influences
the college decision via the return to time investment in schooling. My framework allows
price growth to also influence the returns to college quality and human capital accumulation
on the job by endogenizing human capital accumulation in college and on the job.
The evolution of the distribution of initial human capital across cohorts (the cohort effect)
plays only a minor role in the slowdown in college attainment. Figure 8, “Cohort effect
only”, shows college attainment when price growth is kept constant to its average between
pre-1970s growth and post-1970s growth, so that the only differences between cohorts are
the initial human capital distribution and the price at age 19. College attainment does not
slow down in this second experiment.
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Birth Data Model
cohort Baseline Time effect only Cohort effect only
1920 to 1950 1.15% 2.10% 1.91% 2.39%
1950 to 1970 -0.09% -0.38% -0.38% 1.29%
Table 6: Results. Average change in college attainment. The table reports the slope
coefficient resulting from regressing the fraction of high school graduates with a college
degree in a cohort on a constant and a cohort trend. Source: IPUMS-USA and author.
Figure 13b plots the college premium for the 1920 to 1970 cohorts.19 The model generates an
increase in the college premium for the cohorts 1920 to 1970: the college premium increases
13 percent both in the model and in the data. The cohort-over-cohort pattern of the college
premium in the model follows the data quite nicely. Both in the data and in the model, the
college premium persistently grows across successive cohorts born between 1920 and 1970,
with the exception of the 1930s cohorts. During the 1930s cohorts, the college premium
decreases by 7.43 percent in the model and by 4.28 percent in the data. Lastly, notice
that the model generates an increasing college premium for the cohorts of the slowdown in
college attainment, as shown in the data. Between the 1940s and the 1960s cohorts, the
college premium increases by 19.2 percent in the model and by 12.1 percent in the data.
The increase in the college premium is generated by a combination of both exogenous forces
in the model: the time effect and the cohort effect. Figure 9 shows a decomposition exercise
of these two effects on the pattern of the college premium. In a first experiment (“Time
effect only”), I keep the initial human capital distribution of each cohort to be the same,
so that the only difference between cohorts is the life-cycle price sequence. The resulting
college premium increases almost exclusively during the 1920s cohorts. In particular, the
college premium increases of only 2.4 percent between the 1940s and the 1960s cohorts. The
cohort effect is a composite of changes in mean and standard deviation of initial human
capital (Figure 9, panels (c) and (d)). The standard deviation effect is predominant. The
standard deviation of initial human capital decreases from the 1920 cohort to the 1930s
19The college premium is defined as median college graduate earnings relative to high school graduate
earnings over ages 31 to 40. Several authors have documented that the fall and rise in the college premium
in the United States in the twentieth century was largely due to changes among young workers, whereas
the college premium among old workers wasn’t very much muted (Murphy and Welch, 1992). In the model,
starting in the 1990s, the college premium among older workers rises far less than it does among young
workers. Because younger workers have a larger planning horizon, they respond to a change in prices much
more strongly than older workers in the model.
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Figure 8: Decomposition exercise. College attainment: time effect and cohort effects. Data
(solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines) vs. Model counterfactuals (dashed, red lines). Source:
IPUMS-USA and author.
cohorts, lessening the increase in the college premium that would have otherwise resulted
from the time effect. The contemporaneous increase in the mean of initial human capital
strengthens this effect only slightly. Symmetrically, the dispersion of initial human capital
increases commencing with the 1940s cohorts, fueling the rise in the college premium.
The time effect influences the pattern of the college premium along with the cohort effect.
Figure 9, “Cohort effect only”, presents the implied pattern of the college premium when
price growth is constant and set to its average between pre-1970s growth and post-1970s
growth, so that the only differences between cohorts are the initial human capital distribution
and the price at age 19. The resulting college premium decreases between the 1920 cohort
and the 1940s cohorts and increases thereafter, even if at a slower pace than in the baseline.
A composition effect is at play. Price growth determines college attainment and so the
average innate ability and average initial human capital of college graduates and high school
graduates. Innate ability and initial human capital determine human capital investment and
so the college premium, which is the ratio of the median human capital supplied to market
work by college graduates relative to that supplied by high school graduates. Pre-1970s price
growth fuels the increase in college attainment, which has a significant selection effect on the
average innate ability and average initial human capital associated with a schooling level and
exert a predominant role in the increase in the college premium during the cohorts 1920s
to 1940s. Previous studies, such as Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) and Laitner (2000)
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Figure 9: Decomposition exercise. College premium: time effect and cohort effects. Data
(solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines) vs. Model counterfactuals (dashed, red lines). Source:
IPUMS-USA and author.
highlight the importance of selection on the college premium during times of substantial
changes in college attainment. The slowdown in price growth after the 1970s, instead,
encourages an increase in the college premium for the 1940s cohorts by strengthening the
association between college and innate ability.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of initial endowments, innate ability, and initial human
capital, conditional on the education level for two groups of cohorts, 1931-1934 cohorts and
1961-1964 cohorts. While the less-recent group features college graduates with lower innate
ability than that of high school graduates, the more-recent group includes almost perfect
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Figure 10: Results. Marginal distributions of initial endowments, conditional on education.
The first column refers to cohorts born between 1931 and 1934, while the second column
refers to cohorts born between 1961 and 1964. The first row refers to the distribution of
innate ability, while the second row refers to the distribution of initial human capital.
positive sorting by innate ability across schooling levels. The initial human capital margin
does not matter for the college decision of the more recent cohorts of high school graduates,
while it matters for the less-recent cohorts along with the innate ability margin. The reason
is that the two sets of cohorts face differently shaped life-cycle sequences of the price. The
1930s cohorts face low price of human capital at high school graduation and high price
growth over the life-cycle. On the other hand, the 1960s cohorts face high price of human
capital at high school graduation and low price growth over the lifecycle. There is no direct
measure of such a change in college selection over time in the data. However, Taubman
and Wales (1972), Bowen and Turner (1999), and Gemici and Wiswall (2014) offer some
anecdotal evidence in support of such a change.20 Overall, the path of the rental price per
20First, Taubman and Wales (1972) report for cohorts born between 1907 and 1950 the average percentile
score on IQ tests for those who continue on to college and for those who do not. The trend for the former
is positive, while the trend for the latter is negative. Second, Bowen and Turner (1999) document sorting
across majors by SAT math and verbal score, and Gemici and Wiswall (2014) document an increase in the
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Birth Data Model
cohort Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3 Alt4
1920 to 1950 1.15% 2.10% 2.40% 2.45% 2.42% 2.07%
1950 to 1970 -0.09% -0.38% -0.12% -0.85% -1.32% -0.86%
Table 7: Discussion. Average change in college attainment. The table reports the slope
coefficient resulting from regressing the fraction of high school graduates with a college degree
in a cohort on a constant and a cohort trend. Source: IPUMS-USA and author.
unit of human capital has both an intensive- and an extensive-margin effect on the average
innate ability associated with college and so on the college premium.
4.1 Discussion
I explore the robustness of the model results on college attainment by considering alternative
estimates of the price sequence. I also discuss the estimated elasticity of college attainment
to price growth in light of relaxing model assumptions on college expenses and price expec-
tations.
Expectations on price growth The timing of the slowdown in college attainment is not
well reproduced by the model. College attainment slows down commencing with the early-
1940s cohorts in the model and with the late-1940s cohorts in the data. A similar result
appears for the rise in college attainment. The greatest increase in college attainment occurs
for the 1930s cohorts in the model but for the 1940s cohorts in the data. As pointed out
by Cunha and Heckman (2007) expectations of future price growth may play a major role
in choosing to attend college or not. I explore the possible role of individuals’ expectations
on the timing of the slowdown in college attainment by relaxing the assumption of perfect
foresight. I consider the simple alternative scenario of individuals expecting the price growth
observed at high school graduation to persist during their lifetime. Figure 11 and Table 7,
column “Model/Alt 1”, show the implied pattern of college attainment. The timing of the
rise and of the flattening of college attainment in the model aligns with the data under this
alternative scenario. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013) study the path of college attainment
when the assumption of perfect foresight is relaxed and individuals expect education-specific
fraction of students pursuing majors associated with higher SAT math and verbal scores starting with the
late-1940s cohorts.
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Figure 11: Discussion. College attainment under naive expectations. Data (solid lines) vs.
Model (dashed lines) vs Model alternative experiment (dashed, red lines). Source: IPUMS-
USA and author.
prices to remain constant at the level observed at age 17. They find expectations are not a
key driver of the slowdown in college attainment but help improve the model fit.
College expenses Figure 12, panel (a), plots model implied average expenses on college
quality and average tuition and fees for private and public colleges in the United States, by
cohort.21 Between the 1920 cohort and the 1970 cohort, average expenses for college quality
increase about five times in the model and average college tuitions and fees increases about
3 times in the data. The two series are comparable when expenses on college quality are
presumed to reflect only pecuniary costs. I now work under this presumption and relax two
model assumptions. In the preceding formulation, I have assumed that college goers choose
the magnitude of expenses on college quality and that the relative price of college education
is constant. First, I consider an alternative formulation where some college expenses might
be beyond the control of individuals. I divert from the baseline model by assuming that
individuals must pay a fixed cost Kτ in order to complete college. Thus, the problem of an
individual born in cohort τ on the college path writes:
max
{ij}20j=3,e
20∑
j=3
(
1
R
)j−1
Ej −
(
1 +
1
R
)
(e+Kτ )
21The College Board (2007)’s data on average tuition and fees for private and public colleges as a group are
available from academic year 1967-1977 onwards. For academic year preceding 1967-1977, I measure college
expenses as a weighted average between average tuitions and fees in private colleges and average tuitions
and fees in public colleges. The weight is chosen so that college expenses for academic year 1967-1977 match
the data on average tuition and fees for private and public colleges as a group.
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Figure 12: Discussion. College attainment and college expenses under alternative model
formulations. College expenses are normalized so that college expenses for the 1920 cohort
equal 1 in the model and in the data. Data (solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines) vs. Model
alternative experiment (dashed, red lines). Source: IPUMS-USA, The College Board (2007),
Snyder and Dillow (2011), and author.
subject to the usual constraints in eq. 2.2. I normalize K1961−1964 to zero since 1961-1964
cohorts’ expenses on college quality already match the data on average college tuitions and
fees from the calibration of the deep parameters. Then, I discipline the path of the fixed
costs so that the model implied growth in total average expenses on college quality – that
is,
(
1 + 1
R
)
(e + Kτ ), is as close as possible to replicating the growth in observed average
college tuition and fees in the data. The quality of the calibration is summarized in Figure
12, panel (b). Figure 12, panel (c), and Table 7, column “Model/Alt 2”, show the model
implied pattern of college attainment. Pre-1950 cohorts, in particular the 1940s cohorts, are
most affected. For these cohorts, a decrease in college expenses compared to the baseline
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Figure 13: Discussion. College attainment and the college premium under alternative
measures of price growth. Data (solid lines) vs. Model (dashed lines) vs. Model alternative
experiment (dashed, red lines). Source: IPUMS-USA and author.
fuels an increase in college attainment, aligning the model implied timing of the slowdown
in college attainment closer to the data. Donovan and Herrington (2013) find college costs
a key driver of college attainment for the 1930 to 1950 cohorts.
Second, I extend the model by allowing the relative price of college education pt to change
over time. The problem of an individual born in cohort τ on the college path now writes:
max
{ij}20j=3,e
20∑
j=3
(
1
R
)j−1
Ej −
(
pτˆ + pτˆ+2
1
R
)
(e+Kτ )
subject to the usual constraints in eq. 2.2. I normalize p1980−1986 to 1 and restrict the other
relative prices with data on the growth of the cost of higher education net of the growth of
the GDP implicit price deflator. Calculations are based on the Higher Education Price Index
and the Consumer Price Index adjusted to a school-year basis by Snyder and Dillow (2011),
table 34. Lastly, I re-calibrate the fixed costs Kτ such that the model implied growth in total
average expenses in college quality – that is,
(
pτˆ + pτˆ+1
1
R
)
(e+Kτ ), is as close as possible to
replicating the growth in observed college tuitions and fees in the data. Figure 12, panel (d),
and Table 7, column “Model/Alt 3”, show the model implied pattern of college attainment.
I conclude that abstraction from explicit costs of college education does not significantly
alter the measured elasticity of college attainment to price growth.
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Alternative measures of price growth Bowlus and Robinson (2012) estimate price
growth across four education groups for the period 1963-2008. I average their estimates for
high school graduate and college graduate prices to construct an alternative price sequence.
I then compute average price growth for two periods: 1) 1963-1970 and 2) 1980-2008. I use
the resulting average growth rates, gw,t=1963−1970 and gw,t=1980−2008, to check the robustness
of my results. First, I set gw,1 = gw,t=1963−1970 = 1.58% and gw,2 = gw,t=1980−2008 = −0.39%.22
Second, I recalibrate the model parameters to deliver the targets of the baseline calibration
with the exception of cross-cohort life-cycle earnings growth, which was previously used to
discipline price growth. Figure 13 and Table 7, column “Model/Alt 4”, show the implied
pattern of college attainment and college premium. Consistent with the baseline exercise,
college attainment in the alternative exercise slows down starting with the 1940s cohort.
The college premium in the alternative exercise follows the baseline very closely, with the
exception of the 1920-1930s cohorts for which it better aligns with the data.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I assess the quantitative importance of the growth rate of the rental price per
unit of human capital in generating patterns of US college attainment for white males born
between 1920 and 1970. I argue that price growth is a key factor in the pattern of college
attainment. In particular, a decrease in price growth in the 1970s causes college attainment
to remain flat for the cohorts born after 1950 in the US.
Since earnings reflect both the quantity and the price of human capital, the rental price per
unit of human capital is not observable. I write a model of human capital accumulation
in college and on the job to identify the rental price per unit of human capital and to
quantify its importance for the path of college attainment. I calibrate the model to major
patterns of earnings growth and earnings inequality, both across time and over the lifecycle,
for the 1920-1970 cohorts. The calibration implies a decrease in price growth starting in the
1970s. As price growth decreases, the returns to human capital investment decrease and the
opportunity cost of human capital accumulation in college increases relative to that on the
job. Hence, college attainment flattens.
22Because of the structure imposed on price growth, in particular the choice of ω, price growth between
1970 and 1980 also matches Bowlus and Robinson (2012) estimates for the period. See section 3.2.
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One short coming of the model is that it generates a slowdown in college attainment that
starts earlier than in the data. In an alternative exercise, I show that individual expectations
influence the timing of the slowdown in college attainment. When I assume individuals expect
price growth observed at high school graduation to persist during their lifetime, the model
replicates the timing of the slowdown in college attainment as shown in the data. However,
I only scratch the surface of the potential role of individuals’ expectations on the timing of
the slowdown in college attainment.
The slowdown in college attainment is part of a wider phenomenon that involves all levels
of education (see Appendix A). For example, Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) report a flat-
tening of high school graduation rates. As Castro and Coen-Pirani (2013) point out, the
observation that the slowdown in attainment spreads across all levels of education simul-
taneously, supports the idea of a common factor behind such slowdown. The mechanism I
consider produces symmetric implications across schooling groups and, therefore, is qualita-
tively consistent with a general flattening of educational attainment. It would be interesting
to extend the quantitative analysis in this paper to include levels of education beyond a
four-year college degree.
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A Data
IPUMS-USA. I use 1 percent samples for 1940-1970, and 5 percent samples for 1980-2008.
I restrict the sample to employed white males. Observations are weighted. My measure of
educational attainment is the IPUMS variable EDUC, which distinguishes among nine levels
of education, of which I use two: (i) 12 years of schooling (high school, H), (ii) 16 years of
schooling (four-year college, C). My measure of earnings is the IPUMS variable INCWAGE.
It reports total pre-tax wage and salary income, i.e., money an employee received in the
previous calendar year, as midpoints of intervals (instead of exact dollar amounts). I compute
real earnings by applying Consumer Price Index (CPI) weights.
NLSY79. I restrict the sample to white males with no missing observations on earnings
for ages 23 to 45. Among the available cohorts, I focus on cohorts born between 1961 and
1964, to maximize sample size. The final sample contains 403 individuals, 283 high school
graduates (highest grade completed is 12th) and 120 4-year college graduates (highest grade
completed is 16th). Observations are weighed. My measure of earnings includes wages,
salaries, bonuses, and two-thirds of business income. I compute real earnings by applying
CPI weights.
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Figure 14: College attainment in the United States (employed white individuals): fraction
of individuals with a high school diploma that went on to complete a four-year college degree.
Source: IPUMS-USA.
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Figure 15: Educational attainment in the United States (employed white individuals): frac-
tion of individuals in a cohort by highest degree attained. Source: IPUMS-USA.
B Model Derivations
On-the-job human capital accumulation. If an agent of type (z, h1) never returns to
full-time investment once he stops full-time investment, the on-the-job accumulation problem
has a closed form solution. This condition is satisfied if (i) δ ∈ (0, 1], and (ii) price growth
does not increase “too much” over the lifecycle. The analytical solution of the on-the-job
accumulation problem is as follows:
Vj(hj; z,w | S)
{
wj
[
hjaj + b
S
j z
1
1−βS
]
hj ≥ h∗j(z,w | S)
1
R
Vj+1(zh
βS
j + δhj; z,w | S) hj < h∗j(z,w | S),
where h∗j is the cutoff level of human capital at age j under which the individual spends all
his time on human capital accumulation. The recursive formulation of the two constants is:
aj =
{
1 j = T
1 +
1+gj
R
aj+1 j < T
bSj =
 0 j = Tγ (1+gj
R
aj+1
) 1
1−βS + bj+1
1+gj
R
j < T,
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for T = 20 and γ = β
βS
1−βS
S − β
1
1−βS
S . This can be written in non-recursive form as:
aj =
T−j∑
u=0
δu
u∏
k=1
1 + gj−1+k
R
,
bSj =

0 j = T,
γ
(
1+gj
R
) 1
1−βS
 a
1
1−βS
j +
∑T−j−1
u=1
(
aj+u+1
∏u
k=1
1+gj+k
R
) 1
1−βS ×
×
(∏u
k=1
1+gj+k−1
R
) βS
1−βS
 j < T.
College quality. For an agent of cohort τ and type (z, h1), the first order conditions for
college quality for the case of no full-time accumulation on the job are:
u1c
−η2 [( zhη−11 (ewτˆ )1−η2 + (ewτˆ )η−η2 )]η−1 [ zhη−11 u2 + eη−1u3 ]+ e−ηu4 = u5, (6)
where
ηw−η
2
τˆ (1 + gτˆ )
1−η = u1
wτˆ (1 + η) = u2
wητˆη = u3
w1−ητˆ = u4
R2
(1 + gτˆ )(1 + gτˆ+2)
(
1 +
1 + gτˆ
R
)
1
(1− η)a3zhη1
= u5
The LHS of eq. 6 is decreasing in e and the RHS of eq. 6 is a constant greater than zero for
η ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it is true that:
lim
e→∞
LHS = 0, lim
e→0
LHS =∞.
This assures that the solution for e exists and is unique for each type (z, h1).
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C Calibration Details
C.1 Deep parameters
Identification: initial endowments. The distribution of initial endowments is identified
with the age variation of unconditional earnings moments and the college premium. Earnings
of a j-year-old individual of type (z, h1), born in τ , with education S, are
Ej(h1, z,w | S) = wτˆ+2(j−1)hj︸ ︷︷ ︸
potential earnings
−wτˆ+2(j−1) ijhj︸︷︷︸
human capital investment
, that is:
= wτˆ+2(j−1)h1δj−1 −
wτˆ+2(j−1)z
1
1−βS
((
βSaj+1
1 + gτˆ+2(j−1)
R
) 1
1−βS −
j−1∑
u=1
(
βSau+1
1 + gτˆ+2(u−1)
R
) βS
1−βS
δj−1−u
)
,
for a as defined in Appendix B. Average innate ability influences the slope of the earnings
profile. Agents with higher innate ability allocate more time to human capital accumulation
and so have low initial earnings. Later in life, their earnings are higher following higher
human capital investment (in college and on the job). The level of initial human capital
influences the intercept of an individual’s earnings profile and its concavity. The coefficients
of variation of innate ability and initial human capital influence the life-cycle dynamics of
earnings dispersion. A lower dispersion in innate ability implies a lower increase in the
coefficient of variation of earnings over the lifecycle. When all agents are born with equal
innate ability but different initial human capital levels, the model generates a pattern of
decreasing earnings dispersion over the lifecycle through human capital accumulation. Dis-
persion in initial human capital determines the concavity of the life-cycle profile of earnings
dispersion. The correlation of innate ability and initial human capital disciplines how the
two dimensions of heterogeneity come together to shape life-cycle earnings dynamics. The
college premium helps in the identification of the dispersion of initial human capital and the
correlation between innate ability and initial human capital.
C.2 Cohort-specific parameters
Identification: price growth. When investment in human capital is negligible:
Ej = wτˆ+2(j−1)hj − wτˆ+2(j−1)ijhj ' wτˆ+2(j−1)hj,
Ej+1 = wτˆ+2(j)hj − wτˆ+2(j)ij+1hj ' wτˆ+2(j)hj,
and therefore gw,τˆ+2(j−1) ' gEj .
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